California Courts and Effective Versus Operative Dates

What is the difference between a law’s “effective date” and its “operative date”? A common definition of “effective date” is when the new law is “on the books.” A common definition of “operative date” is when the new law becomes operative or is implemented (which commonly, but mistakenly, is described as when the new law is “in effect”).

How do California courts define the two terms? How do the courts distinguish them in determining when a new law applies to a specific set of circumstances? The following are three appellate court decisions that look at the differences between effective and operative dates of statutes in this state.

People v. Camba, 50 Cal.App.4th 857 (1996)

A statute’s “operative date” is the date upon which directives of statute may be actually implemented, whereas a statute’s “effective date” is considered that date upon which the statute came into being as existing law. The Legislature’s power to enact laws includes the power to fix the future date on which the act will become operative; i.e., to establish the operative date for a statute that is later than its effective date.

In the usual situation, the “effective” and “operative” dates are one and the same, and with regard to ex post facto restrictions, a statute has no force and effect until such effective-operative date. [Citation.]’ (People v. Henderson (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 475, 488) [¶] In some instances, the Legislature may provide for different effective and operative dates. (Cline v. Lewis (1917) 175 Cal. 315, 318, 57 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 451, 454 (1974).) ‘[T]he operative date is the date upon which the directives of the statute may be actually implemented.

An enactment is a law on its effective date only in the sense that it cannot be changed except by legislative process; the rights of individuals under its provisions are not substantially affected until the provision operates as law. (People v. Henderson (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 475,) … [T]he courts have recognized the power of the Legislature to establish an operative date later than the effective date…. [Citation.]” (Estate of Martin (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 1, 3–4) “‘[T]he power to enact laws includes the power to fix a future date on which the act will become operative. [Citation.]” (Johnston v. Alexis (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 33, 40) Our task is to ascertain and promote the legislative intent of the enactment. (Id. at p. 41)

People v. Palomar, 171 Cal.App.3d 131 (1985)

A statute providing for the imposition of a restitution fine for felony offenders [West’s Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 1202.4] did not become operative until January 1, 1984, pursuant to the operative clause of the entire act, and could not be retroactively applied to an offense occurring before that date, despite the urgency clause which provided that the statute went into effect immediately upon its enactment.

This legislation was adopted as an urgency measure and was filed with the Secretary of State on September 27, 1983. (Stats.1983, ch. 1092, § 426.) By virtue of the urgency clause the statute went “into effect” immediately upon its enactment, September 27, 1983. (Gov. Code, § 9600, subd. (b); Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c)(1).) However, the legislation further provided that “[t]his act shall become operative January 1, 1984.” (Stats.1983, ch. 1092, § 427; emphasis added.)

“That does lead to the question: why would the Legislature have gone to the trouble of adopting an urgency clause only to put into effect a later operative date? We really don’t know. The Legislature built the structure and that is the last brick they laid.”

“We conclude that Penal Code section 1202.4 did not affect the rights of individuals until January 1, 1984, the operative date of the act and cannot retroactively be applied to any offense occurring before that date. (See Fox v. Alexis (1985) 38 Cal.3d 621) The Legislature may specify the legal effects to be attached to the operative clause. For example, it may specify that a statute will become operative upon the occurrence of a contingency (Busch v. Turner (1945) 26 Cal.2d 817, 821, 161 P.2d 456) or it may specify that some part of a statute will become operative at a date after the date the statute takes effect (See 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, supra, § 33.08, p. 14.)”

In Johnston v. Alexis, 153 Cal.App.3d 33, the Legislature attached an urgency clause to an enactment raising vehicle license fees, stating that its purpose in doing so was to enable the agencies charged with transportation planning to estimate the funds that would be made available. At the same time, it attached a clause making some of the provisions of the enactment operative on a later date. Among these was a provision for an increase in the basic vehicle registration and commercial weight fees. The court applied these differential provisions of the legislation as provided by the enactment.

Brown v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 32 Cal.3d 705 (1982)

Real parties urge that “a proposal establishing a new state agency and appropriating its initial support funds entails not only an appropriation ‘for the ensuing fiscal year’ within the meaning of Art. IV, sec. 12, subd. (a), but also for an indeterminate number of fiscal years thereafter.” Without further legislative action, though, even special appropriations for starting a new agency would not fund its operation in later years.

Moreover, no clause in the Constitution extends to laws that create new agencies or offices the two-thirds requirement the people have prescribed for appropriations (art. IV, § 12, subd. (d)), urgency statutes (art. IV, § 8, subd. (d)), and a limited listing of certain laws on taxation and other matters (e.g., art. XIIIA, § 3; art. IV, § 4). Absent such a clause, the obvious implication is that agency- and office-creating statutes indeed may be passed by simple majority, separately from whatever budget or appropriation act is needed for implementation.

Real parties suggest that the initial costs of an agency are not “usual current expenses” to which budget acts assertedly are confined. (See Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c)(2) (appropriations for usual current expenses take immediate effect); McClure v. Nye (1913) 22 Cal.App. 248 (appropriations to construct buildings were not for usual current expenses and did not take immediate effect).)

Yet the budget bill must itemize “expenditures” (art. IV, § 12, subd. (c)), including capital outlays, whether or not they are usual and current. And both the 1981 and the 1982 Budget Acts include urgency clauses, seemingly to assure their taking immediate effect without reliance on the “usual current expenses” reference in article IV, section 8, subdivision (c)(2).

These cases both define and draw distinctions between effective and operative dates. While a “delayed operative date” (i.e., one that is later than the default date of January 1 following the statute’s enactment) is likely clear in the law, some interesting scenarios have been raised when that same law takes effect immediately as an urgency statute.