Would Codifying Canons of Statutory Interpretation Overstep the Legislature’s Role?

California courts traditionally hold the ultimate authority to interpret what a statute means under Article VI (judicial branch) and Article III, Section 3 (separation of powers). If the Legislature were to write specific, codified “rules of interpretation” for individual bills, does that overstep into the judicial branch’s territory? Or is it a legitimate exercise of legislative intent?

Of course, we know that the 29 California Codes have numerous codified principles of statutory construction. While courts usually default to the “plain meaning” of a statute, if a statute includes a specific section telling judges exactly how to interpret a phrase, should that section be treated as “plain meaning” (intrinsic text) or as a legislative command (extrinsic directive)? 

Current California legal precedent dictates that a statute must first be proven ambiguous before a court can look at legislative preambles or statements of purpose. If interpretive guidance is codified directly into the text, should courts be forced to follow it even if they believe the text is already clear and unambiguous?

Courts rely on established “canons of construction” like Noscitur a Sociis (interpreting a word by the company it keeps) or using specific statutes over general ones. If the California Legislature passes a law with an interpretive directive that contradicts a traditional judicial canon, which one should a judge prioritize?

Courts currently evaluate “cognizable legislative history” (committee reports, floor analyses) to speculate what lawmakers may have intended. If the Legislature codifies direct interpretive rules into the bill itself, does that make traditional legislative history obsolete?

Because the courts of this state are the final arbiters of “what a law means,” the Legislature, even if it codifies one or more canons of statutory interpretation, will likely only be providing guidance (rather than directives) to the judiciary.