Arizona Election Bombshell: Audit & Interface Failures Documented Years Before 2024 Voter Verification Scandal

Arizona contract and technology records reviewed by California Globe show that significant interface, audit, reconciliation, and security-review questions involving the state’s voter registration system were documented years before Arizona officials disclosed a citizenship-verification problem affecting more than 200,000 registered voters in 2024.

The records concern Arizona’s Access Voter Information Database, known as AVID, the statewide voter registration system used by the Arizona Secretary of State’s Office and Arizona counties. California Globe reviewed Arizona State Procurement Office Contract CTR057577, the project’s 2019 Information Technology Authorization Committee presentation, multiple contract change orders, and related procurement records.

The documents show state records identified multiple change orders before and after AVID’s 2019 deployment to address Motor Vehicle Division integration, ServiceArizona interfaces, county synchronization, audit logging, reconciliation, and a later security assessment (see below).

The contract records reviewed by California Globe do not establish that AVID caused the 2024 citizenship-verification problem. Public reporting and state election officials have described that controversy as an MVD proof-of-citizenship records issue involving voters whose citizenship documentation status was incorrectly reflected in state records. The Associated Press reported in October 2024 that the number of Arizona voters classified as having full-ballot access without confirmed citizenship had increased to 218,000. 

The Arizona Secretary of State’s Office stated in October 2024 that it was working with the Arizona Department of Transportation Motor Vehicle Division to review data and confirm that documented proof of citizenship information was being shared between state and county systems in a way sufficient to verify compliance with Arizona voter registration law. The office also said it had begun reviewing the original AVID development requirements to determine whether data received from MVD could be used by the voter registration system to effectively verify documented proof of citizenship. 

State Rep. John Gillette (R-LD30), who has been reviewing the contract record, argues those documents demonstrate Arizona officials knew of significant architecture and interface deficiencies years before the 2024 citizenship-verification controversy.

“The system did not work from day one, yet all involved pushed the roll out,” Gillette wrote in a series of posts on X, arguing the documented change orders show AVID launched while relying on interim interfaces and later-required modifications

Hobbs used a major voter-roll integrity system, touching election data, voter records, database updates, ERIC, MVD, SAVE and system improvement… with an Oregon LLC whose public corporation record points back to a residential Salem address, in her own election.

The contract… pic.twitter.com/NwHbHThtUP

— Rep. John Gillette AZ House LD30 (@AzRepGillette) July 1, 2026

Gillette expanded those claims in a subsequent post, calling AVID “critical election infrastructure” and arguing that the state’s visible contract record raises unanswered questions about system maturity, vendor due diligence, security authorization, penetration testing, the active contract term, MVD and ServiceArizona data flows, county-level automated changes, and public disclosure by election officials. 

An August 2019 ITAC presentation stated the AVID project was “99% complete” and projected to go live Sept. 16, 2019, while acknowledging a five-month delay caused by stakeholder availability and the “complexities of dealing with outside interfaces,” specifically identifying Maricopa County, Pima County, the Arizona Motor Vehicle Division, and the public portal. 

The presentation states Change Order #1 was necessary to “bridge the gap between when AVID goes live and the new MVD MAX system goes live” and acknowledges that “at project inception it was not realized that two separate MVD interfaces were required.” 

The same presentation identifies Change Order #4 as an “unanticipated” requirement after MVD changed how online voter registration information was transferred, requiring “a new interface” between AVID and ServiceArizona. 

Later records show additional auditing capabilities were added after AVID entered service.

A 2022 Change Order #08 states AVID serves as Arizona’s centralized voter registration system while interfacing with separate voter registration systems maintained by Maricopa and Pima counties. The document states county updates synchronize with AVID “on a real-time or overnight basis via multiple web services.” 

The same change order states audits between AVID and the county systems showed “some mechanisms needed to be in place to reconcile differences and understand what may be causing any discrepancies to address them.” It further states that “this functionality was not built as part of the original system,” requiring a formal change order. 

According to the document, the new work established auditing and reconciliation between AVID and the county systems, including logging interfaces, confirmation responses, reports identifying records not confirmed as received, discrepancy identification, and improved data mapping. The document states a meaningful audit of records between AVID and the county systems could only be conducted once the audit work was completed and deployed in production. 

The exhibit lists its intended audience as the AVID Project Team, the Arizona Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of State, the Secretary of State’s Elections Division, and Maricopa and Pima counties. The Arizona Legislature is not listed among the intended audience. 

Referring to Change Order #08, Gillette wrote, “Prior to Change Order ‘8’ in the AVID contract, no real or meaningful audit could occur prior to 2022,” adding that the “Maricopa/Pima transmission problem was not theory; it was a real issue that required a formal change order.”

Gillette has also argued that the lack of audit capability extended beyond county synchronization, asserting that officials “could not audit the ServiceArizona and MVD reconciliation” and that the problem involved “lack of audit from MVD, ERIC, 3rd party vendors and NGOs.” He further alleged that the system suffered from “no event log” and “non fuzzy match duplicates,” citing the AVID statement of work and Change Order #08 as support.

Change Order #08 specifically addresses AVID’s interface-audit work with Maricopa and Pima counties. It does not, by itself, establish Gillette’s broader claims involving ERIC, third-party vendors, NGOs, or MVD reconciliation.

A separate Change Order #09, approved in 2022, commissioned a formal security assessment before the general election. The document states AVID hosting and security were primarily the responsibility of the Secretary of State’s IT team and directed Team INEXL to evaluate AVID’s security posture against industry standards, identify gaps, and recommend improvements. 

The change order states the work was requested as “an additional step for security readiness for the 2022 General election” and because the services were “not part of the current scope of services provided by TI for AVID support.” The document lists a security assessment, implementation support, and optional support, with potential architecture or design impact depending on findings and system-hardening actions. 

Gillette argued that the records do not show independent cybersecurity certification through FedRAMP, StateRAMP, AZRAMP, CISA, Arizona Department of Homeland Security/Cyber Command, ADOA-ASET, an authority-to-operate process, red-team review, source-code review, or comparable third-party certification before AVID entered service.

The procurement record reviewed by California Globe does not independently establish whether such reviews occurred outside the visible contract documents.

The contract remains active. A later amendment extended Contract CTR057577 through April 30, 2028, meaning the system and vendor relationship remain current as Arizona approaches another statewide election cycle. 

A 2024 procurement determination further states that Arizona spent late 2017 through much of 2019 customizing the TotalVote platform to meet Arizona’s requirements, estimates that the procurement-to-production process took approximately three years, and notes that the Secretary of State’s Office intended to replace AVID after the 2024 General Election.

Gillette also questioned Arizona’s use of Oregon-based INEXL Consulting LLC for AVID support and maintenance. Arizona procurement records identify INEXL as the supplier under Contract CTR057577, and a certificate of insurance in the procurement file lists INEXL Consulting at a Salem, Oregon address.

In a recent post, Gillette argued that the vendor’s public footprint “raises a massive due-diligence question” and said the visible contract record did not show sufficient proof that the state independently validated the system before relying on it for statewide voter-roll functions.

Gillette specifically alleged that responsibility extends beyond the contractor, naming Gov. Katie Hobbs, Secretary of State Adrian Fontes, Assistant Secretary of State Allie Bones, former Maricopa County Recorder Stephen Richer, and Arizona Republican Party Chairwoman Gina Swoboda. Swoboda previously worked in the Secretary of State’s Office under Republican Michelle Reagan and Democrat Katie Hobbs, and later served in Arizona Senate election policy circles as reported by Capitol Media Services and KJZZ. 

He further argued they either knew or should have known about the documented deficiencies before the 2024 voter-registration controversy became public.

“The buck stops with the Secretary of State,” Gillette wrote, arguing that Hobbs “owned the original go-live era” while Fontes “owns continued operation, disclosure, remediation, and current risk acceptance.”

The contract documents reviewed by California Globe do not, by themselves, establish that invalid voter registrations resulted from the documented interface issues, nor do they assign legal responsibility to any elected official, contractor, or election administrator. They do establish that Arizona documented MVD integration challenges, ServiceArizona interface changes, county reconciliation work, new audit and logging capabilities, and a later AVID security assessment through formal project records and contract modifications before and after AVID’s rollout.

Several of Gillette’s newer claims involve underlying records or communications not yet independently reviewed by California Globe, including alleged Coconino County automated party-preference changes, a Secretary of State response involving 58 records, communications among county recorders, and Amendment #13 language related to hosting, vulnerability testing, or penetration testing.

In a follow-up message, Gillette said he is still seeking records on what state IT officials could see inside the vendor-hosted cloud environment before the 2021 transfer and when the state obtained control of source code and interface documentation. He argued those dates are central to determining whether Arizona could independently audit AVID’s 2020 data for duplicate or erroneous records.

“The dates are key,” Gillette said.

Gillette said the records raise questions about whether the state could independently verify, after the 2020 election, the existence of duplicate or erroneous registration records in AVID. He has not yet produced documentation reviewed by California Globe showing that duplicate registrations affected ballots cast or vote totals in 2020.

The documents reviewed to date raise questions about auditability, visibility, and system controls, but do not independently establish that election results were altered.

This is a developing story. California Globe will publish follow-up reports as new information becomes available.